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Notes
The Copper Platter Doctrine Revisited
I.

INTRODUCTION

The exclusionary rule associated with the fourth amendment,
particularly as it is applied to the prosecution of state crimes, is a
feature not long incorporated in the constitutional criminal law of
our nation.' It was not until 1914 that the United States Supreme
Court established 2 the rule requiring the exclusion in federal criminal prosecutions of evidence seized by federal officers in violation
of the defendant's fourth amendment rights. 3 Nevertheless, the
Court expressly permitted the use, in federal criminal trials, of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment by state and local
police, since the fourth amendment was not "directed to individual
misconduct of such officials." 4 Thus, evidence turned over to federal
authorities on a "silver platter" was admissible.' The Court later
held that the fourteenth amendment prohibited illegal searches and
seizures by state and local police' and eventually rejected the silver
platter doctrine.7
The Burger Court's dilution of constitutional criminal protec1. The rule was unique when adopted and even today few countries follow it. See Wright,
Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L. REv. 736, 736 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Must the Criminal Go Free].
2. The Court never expressly stated whether it was invoking the exclusionary rule as a
matter of its supervisory power or whether the rule was a constitutional requirement.
3. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The better reading of Weeks, the one
generally subscribed to by commentators, is that the Weeks Court was establishing a constitutionally based rule. See, e.g., Wingo, Growing Disillusionment With the Exclusionary Rule,
25 Sw. L.J. 573, 573 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Wingo]. The nature of the exclusionary rule
became important in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), when the Supreme Court held the
fourth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Only if the
exclusionary rule was an integral part of the rights guaranteed under the fourth amendment
and not simply a remedy would it be applicable to the states. See id. at 655. See also Wingo,
supra, at 575.
4. 232 U.S. at 398.
5. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949) (where federal agent called by city police
to assist in illegal search of a hotel room, there is a federal search subject to the fourth
amendment; if evidence is obtained by state authorities without federal assistance and is
turned over to federal authorities on a silver platter, it is admissible).
6. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See notes 16 and 17 and accompanying text infra.
7. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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tions, s however, has brought into focus an analytically distinct but
similar problem. Several states, striving to keep alive the Warren
Court's approach to constitutional protections for criminal defendants, have created rights as a matter of state law, greater than the
protections provided by the United States Constitution.' But in the
prosecution of federal crimes, the federal courts have uniformly accepted evidence seized by state officials in violation of the law applied by that state. Admitting such evidence has been variously
referred to as the "new silver platter," the "reverse silver platter,"''
and the "copper platter" doctrine." This comment will explore the
case law and policies underlying the federal courts' present approach to this issue, and suggest a more appropriate resolution of
the conflicting interests at stake.
II.

THE SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE

In Weeks v. United States, 2 the Supreme Court prohibited the
use in federal criminal trials of evidence seized by federal officials
in violation of the fourth amendment, reasoning that without this
exclusionary rule, the fourth amendment right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures would be "of no value."' 3 With
limited discussion, 4 the Court announced a second and equally
binding evidentiary rule in Weeks: evidence seized illegally by local
police was admissible in federal criminal trials." Thirty-five years
8. See Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the
Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 421 (1974) [hereinafter cited as New Federalism].
9. See Wilkes, More on the New Federalismin Criminal Procedure,63 KY. L.J. 873, 87374 (1975) [hereinafter cited as More New Federalism].
10. See Note, Expanding State Constitutional Protections and the New Silver Platter:
After They've Shut the Door, Can They Bar the Window?, 8 Loy. U.L.J. 186 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as New Silver Platter].
11. See Ziegler, ConstitutionalRights of the Accused-Developing Dichotomy Between
Federal and Stale Law, 48 PA. B.A.Q. 241, 251 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Ziegler].
12. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
13. Id. at 393.
14. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 210 (1960).
15. 232 U.S. at 398. An entire body of case law arose to determine when a search was
federal or local. In Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), the Court stated that "the mere
participation in a state search of one who is a federal officer does not render it a federal
undertaking ...." Id. at 32. But where the participation of the agent in the search was
under color of his federal office and where the search was in substance and effect a joint
operation of the local and federal officers, it was a federal search. Id. at 33. In Lustig v. United
States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949), the Court declared the decisive factor was "the actuality of a share
by a federal official in the total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence by other than
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later in Wolf v. Colorado,11the Court held that illegal searches and
seizures by state police were prohibited by the fourteenth amendment, but refused to require that the exclusionary rule be applied
by the states.' 7 Wolf necessarily cast doubt on the validity of the
silver platter doctrine," and in 1960, in Elkins v. United States,"
the doctrine was discarded.
Wolf had removed the doctrinal underpinning for the distinction
announced in Weeks: evidence obtained by state police in an unreasonable search or seizure was now in violation of the Constitution.
Thus, regardless of whether federal or state officials conducted the
sanctioned means." Id. at 79. Even if the agent joined the search while it was in progress and
he was in no way responsible for initiating the search, he could be deemed to have participated in it. Where there was federal participation, federal constitutional law was applied. Id.
Since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), whether the search was state or federal, federal
constitutional standards have measured-the validity. But the federal/state distinction has
retained vitality because of statutory requirements-validity of a federal search is conditioned upon a finding that the warrant satisfies federal constitutional requirements and the
provisions of FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. See United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 43 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974); United States v. Coronna, 420 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1970).
What factors a court actually considers in making the determination was demonstrated in
United States v. Bedford, 519 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976), where
the court held the search to be state in nature-federal agents participated solely to supply
additional manpower:
(1) [Tlhe warrant was issued under state law and directed to state officers; (2) the
warrant was predicated on probable violation of state narcotics laws; (3) there was no
evidence of bad faith on the part of either the state or federal officers; (4) federal agents
did not assist in the obtaining of the warrant; (5) there was no evidence that federal
agents instigated or supervised the search; (6) defendant was initially arrested by local
police officers; (7) the majority of the evidence was found by local officers; and (8)the
products of the search, placed in the custody of local police, formed the basis of a state
prosecution.
Id. at 654 n.1.
16. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
17. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a majority of the Court, declared the security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police to be basic to a free society. It was therefore
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and thus enforceable against the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 27.
18. The Wolf Court did not adopt an "incorporation" approach to the fourteenth amendment. If the decision in Wolf had incorporated the fourth amendment into the fourteenth
amendment, the exclusionary rule would have been applied to the states as part of the "bag
and baggage" of the fourth amendment. See Wingo, supra note 3, at 573. If the exclusionary
rule had been applicable to the states, the Elkins decision probably would have been unnecessary.
The plurality opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), unpersuasively argued that
Wolf did incorporate the fourth amendment into the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 655.
Dissenting in Mapp, Justice Harlan pointed out their error. See id. at 679. See generally
Wingo, supra note 3, at 574-75.
19. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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unreasonable search, the evidence was illegally seized, and under
the theory of Weeks, the Court should exclude evidence obtained in
violation of the Constitution. Yet the logic of this approach was not
alone sufficient, the Court said, to justify the exclusion of relevant
evidence from a federal trial. Other considerations had to be present
before the need for complete disclosure of evidence would be outweighed. 20 The first of these other considerations relied on in Elkins
was the much-maligned theory that the exclusionary rule deters
constitutional violations. 21 Thus, the effect of its decision, the Court
theorized, would be to compel state police to respect the guarantees
of the fourth amendment. 22 A second and probably more important
consideration was the concept of federalism.. "The very essence of
healthy federalism depends upon the avoidance of needless conflicts
between state and federal courts. ' 2 Even before Elkins, many states
had adopted an exclusionary rule as a matter of state law. The
Court theorized that federal courts sitting in exclusionary states
were frustrating state policy by admitting evidence lawlessly seized
by state agents. Elimination of the silver platter doctrine would ease
the resulting tensions. 2 Finally, the Court justified its decision by
giving due regard to "the imperative of judicial integrity." If the
American system is to succeed, said the Court, the government
cannot commit crimes or be an accomplice to the willful disobedience of the Constitution in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal. 25 These considerations led the Court to abolish the silver
platter doctrine, doing so as a matter of its supervisory power over
the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts. After
Elkins, evidence seized by state officials during a search which, if
the fourth amendconducted by federal officers would have violated
2
court.
federal
in
ment, was inadmissible
20. Id. at 216.
21. Chief Justice Burger has often expressed his displeasure with the rule. See, e.g.,
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496-502 (1976) (Burger C.J., concurring). Commentators as well
have expressed disillusionment with the rule, basically arguing that there is no proof that it
has the intended "deterrent" effect on illegal police conduct. See, e.g., Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CI. L. REv. 665 (1970); Wingo, supra note
3; Must the Criminal Go Free, supra note 1.
22. See 364 U.S. at 216-21.
23. Id. at 221.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 222-23.
26. Id. Under its supervisory power, the Court barred from federal trials evidence illegally
seized by state police. One year later in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court held
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III.

THE COPPER PLArER DOCTRINE

A.

The Seeds

In an interesting bit of dicta, the Elkins Court stated that the test
used to determine the legality of the search was "one of federal law,
neither enlarged by what one state court may have countenanced,
nor diminished by what another may have colorably suppressed."2' 7
Conceivably, the Warren Court did not anticipate much controversy
from its new evidentiary rule. Committed as it was to promoting an
accused's constitutional rights, it did not perceive the states as
being the eventual champions of such rights.2 But the conservative
majority of the Burger Court has, at the very least, caused a halt to
the Warren Court's "criminal procedure revolution" and has occasionally cut back on the rights of criminal suspects.2 9 Far from accepting these minimal federal standards, several state courts have
sought to restore the protections stripped by the Burger Court and
maintain the Warren Court's more liberal philosophy.39
The question which initially confronted both the state courts and
that the fourth amendment, incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, barred the use of
evidence seized by state police in state trials. After Mapp, the Elkins rule could be viewed
as one of constitutional dimension. See note 17 supra.
27. 364 U.S. at 224. To the extent the rule required that federal law be applied even when
the state law imposed a stricter standard, it was dicta. The evidence introduced in the federal
criminal trial against Elkins was obtained by state police during a search of the home of one
of the defendants under a warrant invalid by federal standards. See id. at 207 n.1.
28. Nevertheless, as Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his dissent in Elkins, many more
restrictive state rules existed even then. For example, some states imposed a more restrictive
right of search incident to arrest and imposed more exacting standards of probable cause. See
id. at 247 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
29. New Federalism, supra note 8, at 421. Wilkes cites as examples: the Court's acceptance of nonunanimous jury verdicts in state criminal cases, Samuels v. Mackett, 401 U.S. 66
(1971), and of the use of immunity to compel incriminating testimony, Zicarelli v. New Jersey
State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972); the Court's narrow interpretation and
nonretroactive application of Warren era decisions, for example, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971), and Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973); and the Court's upholding through
the use of the harmless error doctrine of convictions in which the accused's rights were plainly
violated, Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972). See New Federalism, supra note 8, at 42324.
30. More New Federalism, supra note 9, at 873. Wilkes discusses as examples the California case of People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975),
which rejected the Supreme Court's rule in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973),
which held that the fourth amendment permitted a police officer to conduct a full body search
after a custodial arrest for any offense, and the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v.
Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974), which rejected the Supreme Court's decision in
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), that the defendant has no right to counsel at an
identification session after arrest but prior to the filing of formal charges.
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the Supreme Court, and the one which intrigued commentators,3'
was whether the state courts would attempt to evade the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Federal Constitution and if so, whether
they would be successful. Historically, the Court has declined to
review judgments of state courts resting on adequate state
grounds.32 The Supreme Court, therefore, soon acknowledged that
the state courts, as the ultimate arbiters of state law, were free to
interpret a provision of the state constitution more expansively than
a textually identical or parallel provision of the United States Constitution.3 3 Similarly, the state supreme courts could impose a more
stringent exclusionary rule as a matter of their supervisory power
over their own courts. 3 Although the states could not impose greater
restrictions on their own law enforcement officials as a matter of
federal constitutional law, 35 the greater restrictions were valid when
31. See, e.g., New Federalism, supra note 8; More New Federalism, supra note 9; New
Silver Platter, supra note 10; Note, Commonwealth v. Richman: A State's Extension of
ProceduralRights Beyond Supreme Court Requirements, 13 DuQ. L. REv. 577 (1975).
32. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 107, at 542-48 (3d ed.
1976). Statutory authority for Supreme Court review of state court decisions is conferred by
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970), which restricts review to state judgments involving federal questions.
The Supreme Court will not disturb state court decisions resting on adequate, independent
state grounds (e.g., state constitution) that do not contravene the Federal Constitution, even
though a federal question is involved (e.g., Federal Constitution) because after the Supreme
Court corrected the federal question, the state court could render the same judgment. See
also New Federalism, supra note 8, at 426-31.
33. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). The Court held that the Oregon Supreme Court
had erred in ruling that the Federal Constitution barred the impeachment use of incriminating statements obtained from defendant after his request for counsel had been denied. In
doing so the Court noted that "a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater
restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards . . . . But, of course, a State may not impose such greater restrictions as
a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing
them." Id. at 719 (emphasis by the Court) (citations omitted). See also Cooper v. California,
386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
Even before Hass, the California Supreme Court stated in People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.
3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, where it rejected the Supreme Court's rule in United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973): "[Tlhe Supreme Court has clearly recognized that
state courts are the ultimate arbiters of state law, even textually parallel provisions of state
constitutions, unless such interpretations purport to restrict the liberties guaranteed the
entire citizenry under the federal charter." 13 Cal. 3d at 548, 531 P.2d at 1112, 119 Cal. Rptr.
at 328.
34. See People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974), where the Michigan court
rejected the Supreme Court's decision in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) and held that
a Michigan defendant is entitled to assistance of counsel at any pretrial lineup. The court
characterized its holding as an exercise of its constitutional power to establish rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings in Michigan courts.
35. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975). See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
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properly implemented. The question having been thus decided, federal courts were called upon to exclude from consideration in the
prosecution of a federal crime, the fruits of searches by state officers
in violation of state constitutional law, even though the method of
obtaining the evidence might have complied with the requirements
of the fourth and fifth amendments as interpreted by the Supreme
Court. Of the nine United States Circuit Courts of Appeals which
have been presented with this claim, all have admitted the evidence. 31
B.

The Growth

Admission of such evidence is, without much argument, consistent with the mandate of case law. As previously noted,3 7 Elkins
stated that the test of admission was one of federal law, regardless
of a more or less stringent rule applied by the state. Admittedly, this
portion of Elkins was dicta, but at least one court 8 has asserted that
Elkins' companion case, Rios v. United States,3' held that federal
law was applicable even when the state standard was stricter. The
defendant in Rios was prosecuted in state court for possession of
narcotics, and acquitted when the state court suppressed the evidence seized by local police officers. The evidence was then given
36. Second Circuit: United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1975). Third Circuit:
United States v. Scolnick, 392 F.2d 320 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nor. Brooks v. United
States, 392 U.S. 931 (1968); United States v. Bedford, 519 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976); United States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d 1369 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976). Fourth Circuit: United States v. Johnson, 451 F.2d 1321 (4th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1018 (1972). Fifth Circuit: United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d
605 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Coronna, 420 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1970). Sixth Circuit:
United States v. Votteller, 544 F.2d 1355 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hodge, 539 F.2d
898 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977); United States v. Dudek, 530 F.2d 684
(6th Cir. 1976). Seventh Circuit: United States v. Infelice, 506 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975); United States v. Martin, 372 F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 919 (1968). Eighth Circuit: United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir.
1975); United States v. Neville, 516 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975).
Ninth Circuit: United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1075 (1977); United States v. Keen, 508 F.2d 986, (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929
(1975). Tenth Circuit: United States v. Millar, 543 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1976); Ferguson v.
United States, 307 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 375 U.S. 962 (1963).
37. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
38. See United States v. Dudek, 530 F.2d 684, 690 (6th Cir. 1976) (court recognizes that
statement in Elkins made in the context of a more restrictive federal standard of admissibility
than that of the state concerned and may be regarded as dicta; however, in Rios, federal
standard was held to prevail over a possibly more restrictive state standard).
39. 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
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to federal authorities. In the federal prosecution which followed, the
evidence was admitted on alternative grounds-the silver platter
doctrine or search incident to a lawful arrest-and the defendant
was convicted.40 The Supreme Court cited Elkins to invalidate the
lower court's reliance on the silver platter doctrine and remanded
to the district court to determine the legality of the arrest and the
search under federal law.4 Since the evidence was suppressed in the
state court but held validly seized as incident to a lawful arrest in
federal court, the state arguably applied a stricter standard. The
remand by the Supreme Court indicated that the stricter standard
was not to apply. But this is not necessarily an accurate reading of
Rios, since it is not clear that the state employed a higher standard
for probable cause. Rather it appeared the state court made a factual determination of no probable cause using a federal standard.2
The remand by the Supreme Court could, therefore, have been
aimed at a distinct element of the Elkins test-the federal court
must make an independent inquiry whether or not there has been a
state inquiry.43
In admitting the evidence, other lower federal courts have found
support in pre-Elkins decisions of the Supreme Court raising issues
analogous to those present in "copper platter" cases. In Olmstead
v. United States" and On Lee v. United States," federal agents
obtained evidence in violation of state laws; in Olmstead, the agents
tapped a telephone line," and in On Lee, a conversation was overheard via a hidden transmitter on a government informer.4 7 In both
40. Id. at 254.
41. Id. at 261-62.
42. It is not clear whether the judge was using a state standard stricter than the federal
standard. The state trial judge could not find that probable cause existed based simply on
the defendant's suspicious activities. See id. at 258 n.3. The Supreme Court apparently
agreed that probable cause was lacking and made no mention of a stricter state standard:
"Yet upon no possible view of the circumstances revealed in the testimony of the Los Angeles
Id.
officers could it be said that there existed probable cause for an arrest at the time .
at 261.
43. Immediately before declaring that the test was to be one of federal law, the Elkins
Court stated: "in determining whether there has been an unreasonable search and seizure
by state officers, a federal court must make an independent inquiry, whether or not there has
been such an inquiry by a state court, and irrespective of how any such inquiry may have
turned out." Id. at 223-24.
44. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
45. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
46. 277 U.S. at 456-57.
47. 343 U.S. at 749.
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cases the Court held that the violation of state law did not render
the evidence inadmissible in federal courts."
The cases can be readily distinguished from those in which a
seizure by state police violates state constitutional standards since
the "wrongful" conduct in Olmstead and On Lee was that of federal
agents, and state control over federal activities is practically nonexistent. Nevertheless, the cases indicate that state law will have
no impact on federal evidentiary rules.
A curious deviation from this entrenched policy of applying federal law occurred in a pre-Elkins Supreme Court case, United States
v. Di Re.5' The defendant was arrested without a warrant by New
York police for a federal offense. The Supreme Court held that
under these circumstances, the law of the state would govern in the
absence of an applicable federal statute.5 ' Thus, the admissibility
of evidence seized incident to a warrantless arrest was determined,
at least initially, by a state's arrest law. Some circuits interpreted
Elkins as sapping all vitality from Di Re, ruling that federal courts
48. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 468-69; On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. at
754-55.
49. The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, requires that activities of the federal
government be free from state regulation. See Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445
(1943). See generally B. ScHwARZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 29 (1972). Thus, the states' power
to control employees of the federal government, in this case, federal law enforcement agents,
while carrying out that employment is minimal. In Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920),
the defendant was convicted for driving a post office truck transporting mail in Maryland
without a license. The Court held that the immunity of the instruments of the United States
from state control in the performance of federal duties extended to driving license requirements. But direct state interference with federal functions was permitted where the public
inconvenience from the interference was slight and outweighed by inconvenience to the state.
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1869) (arrest of mail carrier for murder is not
obstructing mail).
Some of the arguments for applying state law when state police-obtained evidence is introduced in federal court are applicable to federal agent-obtained evidence. See Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting), 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(1928). However, supremacy questions are much more troublesome when the contested evidence was seized by federal officials. This comment focuses on applying state law when the
evidence was seized by state police officers. See note 159 infra.
50. 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
51. Id. at 589. It is interesting to note that the rationale for the Di Re decision is no longer
valid. The Court applied state law to determine the validity of warrantless arrests at least in
part because the then-existing federal statute on arrests by warrant called for conformity with
the particular state's usual mode of process. See id. Under the modern statute, 18 U.S.C. §
3041 (1970), the standards for federal warrants of arrest are set by the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1234 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977).
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must apply federal law in resolving evidentiary questions.52 Other
circuits have continued to apply Di Re to pure arrest questions,"
and a recent Supreme Court case cited Di Re with approval."
Whether Di Re has been overruled is, therefore, questionable.
The more troublesome question posed by Di Re is how it is to be
applied. At issue in United States v. Hall,5" a circuit court decision,
was the admissibility of evidence seized incident to an arrest. In
making the arrest, state officers relied on information obtained by
federal agents in a wiretap. The defendant alleged that the wiretap
was unlawful under California law and that the use of such information violated California law; he argued that under state law, the
arrest and the subsequent search and seizure was therefore illegal
as a fruit of the wiretap and the evidence thus inadmissible, citing
Di Re. The court held Di Re was not applicable. First, Hall was
not a situation where a federal statute was lacking-the Wiretapping
was sanctioned by federal statute. 57 The court found a second and
"more fundamental" reason for distinguishing Di Re: "Di Re concerned the quantity of evidence necessary for a warrantless arrest,
not the source of admissibility of that evidence. 5' 8 Hall's argument
was not that the state officers lacked probable cause or otherwise
failed to comply with the state's arrest law, but that the state police
used impermissible evidence in establishing probable cause.
In a strong dissent, three circuit judges postulated that a state's
judicial limitation on the manner in which state officers obtain
information is a limitation on the arrest power as valid as any statutory requirement. Hall's arrest under California standards was ille52. See United States v. Melancon, 462 F.2d 82, 91-92 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1038 (1972); United States v. Miller, 452 F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
926 (1972); 'United States v. Sims, 450 F.2d 261, 262-63 (4th Cir. 1971). See also New Silver
Platter,supra note 10, at 202-03.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1075 (1977); United States v. Lyles, 488 F.2d 290, 292 & n.4 (5th Cir.) (doctrine still followed
in most cases), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 851 (1974); Montgomery v. United States, 403 F.2d 605,
608 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859.(1969).
54. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 420 n.8 (1976) ("The rule recognized by the
Court [is] that even in the absence of a federal statute granting or restricting the authority
of federal law enforcement officers, 'the law of the state where an arrest without warrant takes
place determines its validity.' ").
55. 543 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977).
56. Id. at 1232.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1233.
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gal and under Di Re should be held invalid in federal court.59
The factual situation in Hall is probably within a literal reading
of Di Re. But the majority's approach in Hall appears to be more
consistent with the Elkins rule. Di Re should not compel federal
courts to defer to state law in deciding the admissibility of evidence
used to justify a warrantless arrest. But even assuming a more expansive interpretation of Di Re is proper, the case has little impact
on the questions which are the focus of this comment. Only occasionally is the question before the court one of the admissibility of
evidence seized incident to an arrest. More frequently, the issue
concerns other areas of search and seizure law.
IV.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

As the above discussion shows, case law overwhelmingly supports
the admission in federal court of evidence seized by state officers in
violation of state law if the seizure meets minimal federal standards.
Probably because of this mandate, few courts have attempted to
analyze the underpinnings of the copper platter doctrine. The lack
of discussion, however, is.both unfortunate and ironic. In abolishing
the silver platter doctrine, the Elkins Court expressed disappointment in the legal community for accepting without question for
thirty-five years, an evidentiary rule promulgated by the Supreme
Court without much discussion.6 But the Elkins Court fell prey to
its own admonishment, creating the copper platter doctrine with no
discussion of the competing policies at stake.
Certainly, the silver platter doctrine and the copper platter doctrine do not generate the same constitutional objections. The Elkins
Court noted that the evidence handed over to federal authorities on
a "silver platter" was, after Wolf, seized in violation of the United
States Constitution, the law which the Supreme Court is bound to
uphold. In the typical copper platter situation, the state police have
violated a state constitutional or statutory provision, but their actions are entirely permissible under the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court is not bound by state law and may. accept the
59. Id. at 1246.
60. The Court stated: "Despite the limited discussion of this second ruling in the Weeks
opinion, the right of the prosecutor in a federal criminal trial to avail himself of evidence
unlawfully seized by state officers apparently went unquestioned for the next thirty-five
years." 364 U.S. at 210.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 16: 613

evidence. This distinction may appear obvious, but many defendants have overlooked it, causing some courts to misapprehend the
issue before them. For example, in United States v. Scolnick,6" the
defendant alleged that the search of his safe deposit box by local
police violated a Pennsylvania statute; therefore, he argued, the
contents were inadmissible in a federal criminal prosecution because of the fourth amendment. 2 With the issue so framed, the
result is foregone. The requirements of the fourth amendment are
determined by the Supreme Court. As the Court stated in Oregon
v. Hass,3 state courts "may not impose. . . greater restrictions as
a matter of federal constitutional law when [the Supreme] Court
specifically refrained from imposing them."6 State statutes should
be similarly ineffective in imposing greater federal constitutional
rights. Thus, a violation only of state law cannot give rise to a
federal constitutional requirement of exclusion. 5
Recall, however, it was not the logic of the constitutional approach upon which the Elkins Court relied in discarding the silver
platter doctrine. Rather, the notions of federalism and judicial integrity are what prompted the Court to exercise its supervisory
power and exclude relevant evidence. 66 While Elkins and Hass preclude the exclusion of evidence as a matter of federal constitutional
law, a careful reading of those cases indicates that a defendant can
legitimately argue that the evidence should be excluded on policy
considerations of federalism and judicial integrity. Nowhere is the
61. 392 F.2d 320 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Brooks v. United States, 392 U.S. 931
(1968).
62. Id. at 323.
63. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
64. Id. at 719.
65. A similar contention was raised by the defendant in United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d
605, 614 (5th Cir. 1975), where the defendant argued that, in spite of the fact that he was
prosecuted in a federal court for a federal crime, his fourteenth amendment rights were
violated because the evidence seized by state police would have been excluded by the state
courts. The court rejected this as meritless.
Defendant's theory of the fourteenth amendment as a limitation on the federal government
is not altogether clear. Nevertheless, the basic argument here, that violation of state law may
give rise to a federal constitutional objection is not entirely specious. Justice Traynor of the
California Supreme Court, commenting upon Mapp, recognized that federal rules and state
rules might vary and urged that federal rules not automatically replace local ones. Necessarily
aware of the Olmstead line of cases and the Elkins decision, Traynor nevertheless assumed
that local rules would have "constitutional sanction, for whatever action is illegal is perforce
unreasonable." Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 328
[hereinafter cited as Traynor].
66. See notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra.
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need for a policy decision better evidenced than in the double prosecution cases. For example, in United States v. Bedford, 7 the defendant was charged with possession of narcotics, seized by local police
during a search of the defendant's residence pursuant. to a search
warrant. In the state action, the defendant was acquitted after the
evidence was suppressed, apparently because the warrant was invalid due to an unreasonable delay in its execution."8 The evidence
was transferred to federal authorities and the defendant was successfully prosecuted for violating federal laws"9 because the warrant
was valid under federal constitutional requirements.
Perhaps sensing the conflict inherent in such an outcome, some
circuits have attempted to rationalize the admission of evidence
obtained in violation of a state constitution. Relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in Olmstead v. United States,70 the Ninth
Circuit has asserted that the exclusionary rule is "integrally bound
up with the constitutional protections of the fourth amendment,"
and therefore does not compel exclusion of evidence seized in violation of state standards." In Olmstead, the Supreme Court stated
that without congressional sanction courts did not have the discretion to exclude evidence obtained in an unethical manner if the
seizure was constitutional, because such a rule would be at variance
with the common law doctrine." At common law, the admissibility
of evidence was not affected by the illegality of the means through
which the evidence was obtained.13 Thus, the Ninth Circuit has held
that "[wihere no constitutional right has been abused, the admissibility of evidence is governed by common law principles."7'
The validity of this black letter rule is questionable. In On Lee v.
67. 519 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976).
68. Id. at 653, 656.
69. There is no fifth or fourteenth amendment (double jeopardy) violation in prosecuting
an individual once under federal law and once under state law for the same act. See Abbate
v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). Similarly,
notions of collateral estoppel are not applicable. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
70. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
71. United States v. Keen, 508 F.2d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929
(1975). See also United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1235 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1075 (1977).
72. 277 U.S. at 468.
73. As a general rule, our legal system does not attempt to do "justice" incidentally and
to enforce penalties by indirect means. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 2183, at 7-8 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
74. United States v. Keen, 508 F.2d at 989.
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United States, 5 the Court commented on its power to fashion exclusionary remedies: "In order that constitutional or statutory rights
may not be undermined, this Court has on occasion evolved . . .
exclusionary rules of evidence going beyond the requirements of the
constitutional or statutory provision." 8 Thus, it appears the courts'
powers are not as limited as Olmstead and the Ninth Circuit suggest.77
The nature of the exclusionary rule and its treatment by the
Burger Court have furnished some courts a second ground for justifying the copper platter doctrine. The exclusionary rule is by no
means a universally accepted resolution to constitutional violations
by police,7" and has been subject to constant criticism since its
adoption by the Supreme Court.79 Cardozo crystallized the many
objections in stating: "The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."" The exclusionary rule blocks the introduction of arguably relevant and trustworthy evidence and hence is an
obstacle to the truth-finding function. Whether the rule is an effective control on police conduct or not, it operates only at a great cost
to society.8 ' Thus, the Second Circuit noted in justifying nonapplication of the rule to violations of state constitutional law: "[The]
75. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
76. Id. at 755.
77. Nevertheless, the courts are "wary" to extend the exclusionary rule in search and
seizure cases to violations which are not of constitutional magnitude. See United States v.
Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386 (2d Cir. 1975).
78. Countries with whom we share many of our legal traditions, such as England and
Canada, did not at the time the United States Supreme Court developed the exclusionary
rule, and still do not, make the admissibility of evidence at trial depend on how the evidence
was obtained. Before the Supreme Court imposed the exclusionary rule on the states in 1961,
only about one-half had adopted a similar restriction. See Must the Criminal Go Free, supra
note 1, at 736. See also Williams, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign Law-England, 52
J. CRiM. L. C. & P.S. 272 (1961).
79. See, e.g., Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REv. 665 (1970); Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 MICH. L. REv. 169 (1955); Wingo,
supra note 3; Must the Criminal Go Free, supra note 1.
80. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). The plurality opinion in
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) also succinctly catalogues the doctrine's defects:
Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing official, while it may,
and likely will, release the wrong-doing defendant. It deprives society of its remedy
against one lawbreaker because he has been pursued by another. It protects one against
whom incriminating evidence is discovered, but does nothing to protect innocent persons who are the victims of illegal but fruitless searches.
Id. at 136.
81. See notes 79-80 and accompanying text supra.See generally McCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK
OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 166 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
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rule . . . [is] 'a blunt instrument, conferring an altogether dispro,,,8 Circuit courts relying on the nondesiraportionate reward .
bility of the exclusionary rule further prop their decisions by pointing out the Burger Court's, and particularly Chief Justice Burger's,83
dissatisfaction with the rule." Finding the rule's deterrent effect
minimal in certain situations, the Court has limited the rule's scope
in decisions such as United States v. Janis" and Stone v. Powell.8"
Since the Supreme Court is reluctant to extend the exclusionary
rule as a matter of federal constitutional law, these lower courts
apparently have inferred that the exclusionary rule should not be
extended for any reason. But in thus focusing on the question, the
courts are once again demonstrating their misconception of the nature of the issue before them. The balance is not simply the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule versus the cost to society. A state
has determined that the cost is worthwhile to control the conduct
82. United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386 (2d Cir. 1975).
83. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 420 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("the
Court errs gravely in mechanically applying the exclusionary rule without considering
whether that Draconian judicial doctrine should be invoked"); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
496 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("it seems clear to me that the exclusionary rule has
been operative long enough to demonstrate its flaws"); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 412-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1235 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1976) (court
concluded that trial court did not err in admitting in federal criminal prosecution evidence
seized by state police in violation of state law because states do not control rules of federal
evidence and because Supreme Court is reluctant to extend exclusionary rule), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1075 (1977).
85. 428 U.S. 433 (1976). The Court held that evidence seized by Los Angeles police in
violation of the Constitution was admissible in a federal civil tax proceeding. Common sense
dictates, the Court stated, that the deterrent effect of the exclusion of relevant evidence is
highly attenuated when the punishment is the removal of the evidence from a civil suit by or
against a different sovereign. "The extension of the exclusionary rule . . . would be an
unjustifiably drastic action by the courts in pursuit of what is an undesired and undesirable
supervisory role over police officers." Id. at 458.
86. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The Court held that on petition for habeas corpus relief, a
prisoner could not raise the claim that his conviction was based upon evidence obtained by
an unconstitutional search where he had been afforded an opportunity for a full and fair
litigation of his constitutional claim in state courts. The Court stated:
There is no reason to believe, however, that the overall educative effect of the exclusionary rule would be appreciably diminished if search-and-seizure claims could not
be raised in federal habeas corpus review of state convictions. Nor is there reason to
assume that any specific disincentive already created by the risk of exclusion of evidence at trial or the reversal of convictions on direct review would be enhanced if there
were the further risk that a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on direct
review might be overturned in collateral proceedings often occurring years after the
incarceration of the defendant.
Id at 493 (footnote omitted).
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of its police. The federal courts are failing to give any weight to the
state's policy judgment without any explanation.
Viewing the problem in terms of sovereignty and supremacy,
some courts have come closer to the proper analysis. In Feldman v.
United States,"7 the defendant had given testimony in a state judicial proceeding under a state immunity statute. This testimony was
admitted in the defendant's subsequent federal trial, and the Court
held there was no fifth amendment violation by self-incrimination,
even though the defendant's testimony was compelled at the state
level.8 8 Citing Chief Justice Taney, the Court noted that while state
and federal governments exist within the same territorial limits,
they are separate and distinct sovereignties acting independently of
each other.89 Thus, a state cannot restrict the operation of national
government by affecting its rules of evidence. In Olmstead v. United
States,90 the Court held a state statute prohibiting the interception
of telephone messages would not affect the admission of evidence in
a federal trial obtained by federal agents in the proscribed manner.
Again the Court cited Chief Justice Taney to emphasize that it
could not be supposed that Congress intended to place the criminal
jurisprudence of the federal government under the control of state
government." Following this analysis, the Tenth Circuit permitted
the introduction of evidence seized by state police in violation of
state law since "the course of a federal criminal prosecution cannot
'9 2
be controlled by state law.
There can be little argument with the assertion that state courts
cannot within their constitutional power "control" the federal
courts' evidentiary rules, or that a violation of state law should not
be the basis of a federal constitutional violation. By concentrating
on the concepts of sovereignty and supremacy, however, state interests are still ignored. A defendant who intelligently pleads a viola87. 322 U.S. 487 (1944). The state procedure was known as "supplementary proceedings,"
designed to aid in the discovery of assets of a debtor. The state immunity statute provided
that a debtor might not be excused from testifying because of self-incrimination but that his
testimony could not be used in evidence in a subsequent criminal proceeding against him.
The defendant Feldman had been a judgment debtor in the state proceeding. Id. at 488.
88. Id. at 489.
89. Id. at 491. Chief Justice Taney is often cited for his views on the separation of state
and federal power. See New Silver Platter,supra note 10, at 204 n.4.
90. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
91. Id. at 469.
92. Ferguson v. United States, 307 F.2d 787, 790 (10th Cir. 1962), rev'd and remanded on
other grounds, 375 U.S. 962 (1964).
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tion of state constitutional law is not asserting that a federal court
must abide by state law, but that it should do so. 3 This necessitates
an inquiry beyond power.
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Shaffer,' resolved the
admissibility question on federal grounds, but in doing so was the
first court to consider the competing policies at stake. The court
believed the application of federal rules was grounded in sound
policy considerations. By prohibiting the introduction of evidence
obtained by state officers in violation of the state constitution, some
convictions would undoubtedly be lost; this result would weaken the
congressional policy expressed in the federal criminal statutes.
Admittedly, the state had an interest in supervising the conduct of
its police officers, but the court felt that policy could be equally
effectuated through the use of civil suits. The court decided that
whatever harm was done to the state's policy, it was not sufficient
to warrant deviation from the federal rules. 5
In subsequent cases, the Sixth" and Eighth 7 Circuits have used
a "back door" approach to introduce considerations of state interests. While adhering to the rule that in federal criminal prosecutions
federal standards are applied to determine the admissibility of evidence, they note it is permissible to look to state law in the course
of the federal determination of admissibility." The decision in each
of these cases was no different than if the court had applied a per
se "federal law governs" rule. They are significant, however, because in both cases more appropriate questions were asked.
93. The defendant would be equally unsuccessful in making a tenth amendment attack,
i.e., arguing that the mere admission of evidence in federal court is the sort of federal action

"that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system."
See United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1245 (9th Cir. 1976) (Koelsch, J., dissenting) (citing
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977).
94. 520 F.2d 1369 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
95. Id. at 1372.
96. United States v. Dudek, 530 F.2d 684, 689 (6th Cir. 1976).
97. United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1365 (8th Cir. 1975).
98. In Dudek, state police had seized evidence pursuant to a search warrant but violated
OHIo R. CraM. P. 41(D) by failing to "verify" the inventory and by failing to "promptly"
return the warrant. The court gave extensive consideration to the issue of whether under Ohio
law the failure would require suppression of the fruits of the search. Under a simple "federal
law governs" approach, this discussion would have been superfluous. 530 F.2d at 687-91. In
A lery, at issue was the admissibility of testimony arguably excludable under a state privilege
law; the "exclusionary rule" was not involved. 526 F.2d at 1364-65. The relationship between
privileges and the exclusionary rule and the special rules applicable to privileges will be
discussed infra.
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COMPARISON OF THE SILVER AND COPPER PLATTER DOCTRINES

The conflicts and problems created by the copper platter doctrine
are not unlike those which led the Supreme Court to eliminate the
silver platter doctrine. Justice Frankfurter, in fact, authored a
scathing dissent in Elkins, demonstrating that the majority's requirement that federal standards be applied, even when state law
furnished the defendant greater protection, frustrated the very values the majority was verbally promoting. The Elkins rule was to
insure a healthy federalism by avoiding needless conflicts between
state and federal courts, but copper platter doctrine exacerbates
state-federal tensions. The state has imposed the exclusionary rule
for certain constitutional or statutory violations to attempt to protect individuals from unlawful police conduct. Far from fostering
federalism, the Elkins rule disregards valid state policies; it rejects
all comity considerations." Frankfurter perceived another problem
in the Elkins requirement that the federal court make an independent inquiry into the validity of the search. A separate federal court
factual finding has the effect of "debilitating local authority" in
controlling local police conduct, a matter in which the state courts
should have primary responsibility. '0 Frankfurter concludes there is
little justification for federal courts to encourage state illegalities."°'
There would appear to be little doubt that the effect of the copper
platter doctrine will be to encourage police misconduct. Whatever
deterrent effect the state's exclusionary rule might have on state
officers becomes diluted when a federal court admits evidence which
the state would have excluded. The Burger Court impliedly recognized this in United States v. Janis.02
1 The Court believed the deterrent effect was attenuated when the sanction imposed for a constitutional violation by a police officer was the removal of evidence from
an action by a different sovereign. But, the Court read Elkins to
indicate that "the assumed interest of criminal law enforcement
officers in the criminal proceeding of another sovereign counterbalanced this attenuation sufficiently to justify an exclusionary
rule. ' 0 3 Many crimes are a violation of both state and federal laws,
99. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 245, 248 (1960) .(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 248.
101. Id. at 246.
102. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
103. Id. at 458. The Court examined the problem in terms of the offending law enforcement officer's "zone of primary interest." It would appear that a prosecution by a different
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e.g., possession and sale of narcotics and bank robbery. When investigating these crimes, local police can disregard the stricter rules
employed by their state. If the defendant should object and successfully prove the constitutional violation in state court, there is still
an opportunity for federal prosecution.
A second concern of the Elkins Court in abolishing the silver
platter doctrine was judicial integrity-the federal courts should not
be a depository for sordid police activities.10 Justice Frankfurter
attacked the majority's reasoning on this point as well, arguing that
the Elkins decision was inconsistent with the concept of judicial
integrity. In measuring the state police conduct by federal standards, the courts might be accepting evidence gathered illegally
under state standards. For Frankfurter, it was "unseemly" for federal courts to benefit by state officers' wrongdoing, even though that
wrongdoing was determined by state law.' 0 Frankfurter was echoing
the sentiments of two other great Supreme Court Justices, Brandeis
and Holmes, dissenting in Olmstead: it is essential that the government not use evidence obtained in violation of state law in order "to
maintain respect for law," "to promote confidence in the administration of justice," and "to preserve the judicial process from contamination." ' "
It should be apparent that neither the Supreme Court nor the
lower federal courts have adequately addressed the severe statefederal conflicts inherent in the copper platter doctrine-conflicts
considered sufficiently severe to cause the demise of the silver platter doctrine. Both the state and federal governments have valid
interests at stake in the typical copper platter situation: the state
is concerned with the conduct of its police while the federal government seeks enforcement of its criminal laws. But to what extent
but concurrent sovereign would be within the primary zone. Frankfurter stated: "A state
officer who disobeys [a state regulation can] turn his evidence over to the federal prosecutors, who may freely utilize it under [the Elkin] innovation in disregard of the disciplinary
policy of the State's exclusionary rule." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 245-46 (1960).
See also United States v. Scolnick, 392 F.2d 320, 328 (3d Cir.) (Freedman, J., dissenting) (to
allow state police to violate a state statute and produce to a federal prosecutor the information
then obtained for use in a federal trial is to lend federal encouragement to the violation), cert.
denied sub. nom. Brooks v. United States, 392 U.S. 931 (1968).
104. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
105. 364 U.S. at 249-50.
106. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 470 (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (1928).
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should the federal court pursue its objective when a by-product is
infringement on strong state policies?
VI.

THE LAW OF PRIVILEGES

The law of privileges, as applied in the federal courts, can furnish
some foundation for the resolution of this question. Privileges have
been subjected to much greater and keener scrutiny by the courts,
Congress, and commentators, and thus an examination of the development of this law provides something more than untested abstract
concepts with which to approach the problem.
Privileges, or more specifically, the evidentiary rule that term
describes, are similar in purpose and effect to the exclusionary rule.
Relevant evidence is excluded and hence the truth-finding function
of the court is interfered with in order to promote a social interest
deemed of sufficient importance to justify the cost. Privileged information is information obtained through a confidential relationship;
it cannot be divulged in court if the holder of the privilege objects
to disclosure. In this manner, a privilege is intended to promote the
full and free disclosure of information between individuals in certain
positions.' 7 Many privileges, unlike the exclusionary rule, have well
established lineages, many with common law origins. 1" Nevertheless, they have been the subject of constant attack by distinguished
scholars, as is evidenced by the American Law Institute's attempt
to limit the scope of many privileges in its formulation of the Model
Code of Evidence.' °9
Not surprisingly, the several states and the federal government
made different value judgments and consequently recognized different privileges. A question akin to that presented in the copper platter situation arose, therefore, when in a federal proceeding someone
107. See McCORMICk'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 72 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
Cf. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
108. For example, the notion that the loyalty owed by the lawyer to his client disables
him from being a witness in his client's case is deep-rooted in Roman law. MCCORMICK'S
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 87 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). The privilege for marital
communication is an offshoot, albeit late, of an ancient tree. Id. § 78. The development of
judge-made privileges has perceptibly slowed and today statutory privileges predominate. Id.
§ 77.
109. See id. § 77, at 156-57 ("The draftsmen of the Model Code clearly favored limiting
the scope of some, if not all, of the privileges, but when the proposed draft was submitted to
the American Law Institute for final approval concessions had to be made and . . . the
generally recognized common law and statutory privileges [were] largely retained ....
").
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tried to block testimony by claiming a privilege valid only under
state law. Modern federal law on this issue finds its genesis in two
0 the
Supreme Court cases circa 1935. In Funk v. United States,"1
defendant was convicted in federal court for violation of federal
prohibition laws, but claimed as error the trial court's ruling that
his wife was incompetent to testify on his behalf. Based on decisions
prior to Funk, federal courts, in determining evidentiary matters in
federal criminal prosecutions, had applied the law of the states as
it existed when federal courts were established by the Judiciary Act
of 1789. Funk rejected the common law disqualification stating that
federal courts have the power to alter the federal rules when fundamentally altered conditions necessitated a change in the common
law principles.'
Clearly, Funk did not involve a question of state-recognized privileges, but it was used as authority in Wolfle v. United States,",
where the Supreme Court refused to recognize a state privilege for
marital communications. In Wolfle, the Court, citing Funk, held
that the admissibility in a federal criminal trial of a secretary's
testimony concerning a conversation between the defendant and his
wife was "not necessarily" to be determined by local rules but rather
by "common law principles as interpreted and applied by the federal courts in the light of reason and experience.""3 Unfortunately,
the Court did not interpret its "not necessarily" language as indicating the need to consider the state policies at stake. In rejecting the
claim of privilege in Wolfle, the Court weighed the federal interests
allegedly served by the privilege against the disadvantages to the
administration of federal justice. The rule that federal law was to
resolve privilege questions was codified some ten years later in rule
26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, "' and was ultimately
110. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
111. Id. at 382.
112. 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
113. Id. at 12.
114. At that time rule 26 provided:
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless
otherwise provided by an act of Congress or by these rules. The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when
an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience.
FED. R. CR1. P. 26, 18 U.S.C. app. R. 26 (1970). See also FED. R. Cam. P. 26, Notes of the
Advisory Committee on Rules. Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 26
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incorporated into rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,11 which
became effective in July, 1975. In its note to rule 501, the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence little doubted the
inviolable nature of Wolfle's statement of the law: "In federal criminal prosecutions the primacy of federal law as to both substance and
procedure has been undoubted.""' But despite the Wolfle Court's
and the Advisory Committee's complete rejection of state law,", it
is not clear that the lower federal courts applied this absolute rule,
at least prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Judge Weinstein, a
respected writer on federal evidentiary rules, noted that a close
analysis of all decisions, reported and unreported, would probably
indicate that in most decisions, courts were seeking a result consis-

8
tent with the state policy involved."

The Advisory Committee supported its approach with several policy considerations. First, by reducing the availability of privileges,
has been amended: "In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court,
unless otherwise provided by an Act of Congress or by these rules, the Federal Rules of
Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court." FED. R. CraM. P. 26.
115. Rule 501 reads:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness . ..shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light
of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to
an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of a witness . . . shall be determined in accordance with State law.
Fm. R. EvID. 501.
116. FED. R. Evm. 501, Notes of Advisory Committee on ProposedRules, reprinted in 2
J. WINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN's EvIDENcE

501[01], at 501-6 (1975).

117. That there has been a complete rejection of state law is not clear. See note 118 and
accompanying text infra. That Wolfle and rule 501 demand complete rejection is also not
clear. Common law principles applied by the federal courts "in light of reason" do not
preclude consideration of state interests. However, as noted, when the Supreme Court rendered the Wolfle decision, it did not consider state interests. See notes 113-14 and accompanying text supra.
118. Judge Weinstein focuses on the unreported rulings.
For every ruling of evidence discussed in a published opinion there are hundreds made
from the bench on the spur of the moment in almost reflexive responses to objections.
The impact of engrained state practice in these instances is probably much higher than
it is where the judge must justify his decision in writing after examining current
authority.
Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules of
Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. Rav. 353, 372 n.82 (1969). He cites as some support, Barnes v. United
States, 374 F.2d 126 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 917 (1967), where the court held that
the physician-patient privilege was not available to a defendant in a federal criminal trial
because Texas, the state in which the information was conveyed, did not recognize the
privilege.
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the rule would promote the fundamental policy of rules of evidence-enhancing accurate fact-finding. Second, the Committee
felt that only an overriding policy could suffice to compensate for
the loss of relevant evidence. The Committee believed that any
state privilege meeting this test would also be recognized in federal
court. Third, the federal system had a sufficient interest in the
adoption of sound and uniform rules of evidence to override a state's
judgment that a certain privilege was desirable."' And, in a note to
a preliminary draft of rule 501, the Advisory Committee stated that
"[n]o state can have a deep interest in the suppression of information except on a constitutional basis."' 0
Most commentators have agreed with the nonapplicability of
state privilege law at least in federal criminal trials: 2 ' "the federal
interest in correct and just decisions when applying federal laws"
outweighs the state interest promoted by a privilege.'2
Agreement with federal exclusivity is, however, not universal.
Shortly after the federal rules were proposed, some commentators
questioned the desirability of reducing the number of available privileges,'23 maintaining that in modem society, privileges are important as protectors of individual privacy.Iu But in many areas of
119. See FED. R. Evm. 501, Notes of the Advisory Committee on ProposedRules, reprinted
in 2 J. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTIN'S EVIDENCE 501[01], at 501-8 to -10. See also 2 J. WEMNSTEN,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
5011031, at 501-21 to -22 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WENSTm ].
As noted, see note 116 and accompanying text supra, the Advisory Committee did not believe
it needed to defend its approach to federal criminal cases. These arguments were to support
applying federal privilege law in diversity cases, when state law furnished the rule of decision.
Certainly, the Committee would have employed these arguments (along with others) to
justify federal privilege law in federal criminal cases if put to the task.
120. Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 5-01 (Preliminary Draft 1969).
121. See 2 WEINSTEIN, supra note 119, 501[03] at 501-25. See, e.g,, 10 MooE'S FEDERAL
PRACTicE § 501.05, at V-30 (2d ed. 1976); Korn, ContinuingEffect of State Rules of Evidence
in the Federal Courts, 48 F.R.D. 65, 77 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Korn]; Ladd, Privileges,
1969 L. & Soc. ORD. (ARiz. L.J.) 555 [hereinafter cited as Ladd]; Wright, ProceduralReform:
Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. Rav. 563, 573 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Procedural
Reform].
122. See Korn, supra note 121, at 77.
123. See, e.g., Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative
to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 61 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Krattenmaker]; Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal
Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101, 122 (1956) (attacking application of federal rules of privilege before formulation of Federal Rules of Evidence).
124. See Krattenmaker, supranote 123, at 85-86 (limitations on testimonial privileges are
"clearly" invasions of privacy). See also McCoamKi'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVmENCE §
77, at 157 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) ("Growing concern in recent times with the increase in
official prying and snooping into the lives of private individuals has reinforced support for
the traditional privileges and no doubt aided in the creation of new ones.").
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privilege law, the answer to whether the exclusion of evidence is too
great a price to pay to foster the protected relationships is a question
over which reasonable men could differ. 125To the extent the problem

is one purely of federal law, further argument would be fruitless. But
competing state and federal interests are involved, and a strategically more sound attack on the federal rule, and a tack taken by
some commentators, is to question the rule's failure to accord any
weight to a state determination that a particular privilege is desirable.
A respected critic of federal privilege law, Professor Louisell, addressed the rule as it was embodied in Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 26 and commented that as a matter of comity, due regard
should be given for local institutions and local interests. Privileges
represent substantive rights protected by the states, institutions
competent in a federal system to protect such rights. Certainly it is
more convenient for the federal government to ignore state privileges, but that does not mean that enforcement of federal criminal
law would be hampered if the federal courts respected the state's
judgment.

126

Another commentator, Professor Krattenmaker, also focused on
the federal rule's effect of impinging on an important state function.
He proceeded from the assumptions that privileges do foster the
right of privacy and that a state privilege greater than a federally
recognized privilege is evidence of a state's desire to provide breathing space for individual liberties. Circumscribing the extent to
which federal courts could override state rules would assure continued vitality of those liberties. More importantly, respecting the
state's privileges would avoid a "monolithic single shot judgment"
on what the proper balance is between the need for evidence and the
interests forwarded by privileges, and, in fact, allows for experimentation in the quest for the most appropriate balance. Finally, due
respect for federalism should lead to encouragement of laws tailored
to meet the divergent problems under differing local circumstances.127
125. See Ladd, supra note 121, at 573 (author suggests several factors which go into the
balancing).

126. Louisell, supra note 123, at 122-23.
127. Krattenmaker, supra note 123, at 100-02. One of the basic virtues of a federal government is that it allows room for governmental and social experimentation by the many states.
Only in this way can many of the complex problems we face be solved. The need for states
to serve as laboratories has been emphasized by several Supreme Court Justices. See Johnson
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These comity arguments have not gone unanswered. In a sense,
the rationale of the federal exclusivity rule responds to the
state/federal conflict. Federal rules should apply because it is federal policy which is being enforced; no state interest can surmount
the federal interest present in such circumstances. Professor Moore,
in his treatise on federal practice, elucidates this counter-argument
in favor of rule 501. "Privileges, because of their important impact
on modes of proof in the federal courts, represents a type of state
law which does 'interfere with the appropriate performance' of the
federal courts' functions. . .. The obligations of comity cease when
state law begins to alter the appropriate functioning of the federal
courts."28
On balance, it appears that the supporters of federal exclusivity
have not refuted the comity objections to the absolute rule. Comity,
or federalism, terms often associated today with the abstention doctrine, were defined by Justice Black, in Younger v. Harris,2 9 as
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact
that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state
governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions
are left free to perform their separate functions in their sepa30
rate ways.
Certainly, when the state interest in promoting a certain relationship through a privilege is weighed against the federal government's
interest in unobstructed access to relevant evidence, a "proper respect for state functions" may not compel federal court deference
to state law. But it is a complete and unwarranted disregard of
comity to argue, as the federal rule supporters have, that the federal
interest is so overwhelming that the importance of the state function
3
need not be evaluated.1 1
v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 133 (1970) (Harlin, J., concurring); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
128. 10 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 501.05, at V-30 (2d ed. 1976).
129. 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal court forbidden to enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution).
130. Id. at 44.
131. Charles Alan Wright supports the rule applying federal privilege law in a federal
criminal case, but admits that even then there is an interference with state policy. See
Procedural Reform, supra note 121, at 573. See also Krattenmaker, supra note 123, at 100 &
n.152.
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Nevertheless, the Federal Rules of Evidence proposed by the Supreme Court were enacted by Congress only after plenary, not simply cursory, scrutiny. 3 2 Article V of the Rules of Evidence on privilege, as submitted to Congress by the Supreme Court, contained
thirteen specific rules, some of which were restrictions upon common law privileges. The House revised Article V, and the result was
a single rule 501-privileges were to be determined by the federal
courts' reasoned interpretation of common law.' The Senate Committee on the Judiciary agreed with the main thrust of the rule as
amended by the House-a federally developed common law should
apply "except where the State nature of the issues renders deference
to State privilege law the wiser course, as in the usual diversity
case."' 34 Controversy surrounding the bill centered only on the treatment of privileges in diversity cases. 13 As the conference report
noted, both the House and Senate intended federal privilege law to
apply in criminal cases.' 3 Thus, the conflict between state and federal law was apparent to Congress, and it consciously chose the
federal law of privileges to be used in federal criminal trials. Under
rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, therefore, the federal
courts are, in criminal trials, prevented from allowing comity considerations to influence privilege choice of law questions.
VII.

THE

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE AND COPPER PLATrER

EVIDENCE

Similar constraints do not exist when the issue shifts to the exclusion of evidence seized by state police in violation of state law. Rule
402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of
evidence: "All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise
132.

Under its statutory authority to prescribe rules of procedure in the United States

courts, the Supreme Court formulated and transmitted to Congress proposed rules of evidence. They were to become effective in 90 days in the absence of a congressional veto. Shortly
thereafter, Congress passed a bill, Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973),

which required affirmative congressional approval before the rules would become effective.
See Krattenmaker, supra note 123, at 61.
133. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Seass. [hereinafter cited as House Report],
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7082.
134. S.REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Seass. [hereinafter cited as Senate Report], reprinted
in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7058.
135. See House Report, supra note 133; Senate Report, supra note 134. See also 2
WEINSTEIN, supra note 119,
501102], 501[03].
136. See CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Seass., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 7098, 7100-01.
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provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority."' 37 Arguably, the same interest in the just and efficient administration of federal criminal law
could lead to interpreting rule 402 as rejecting any consideration of
state law. Furthermore, rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure,35 which governed evidence in federal criminal trials
prior to the adoption of the rules of evidence, was basically preserved in rules 402 and 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In the
Advisory Committee Notes to rule 26, it was stated that the "rule
contemplates the development of a uniform body of rules of evidence to be applicable in trials of criminal cases in the federal
courts."' 39 Certainly, uniformity is equally a goal of the Federal
Rules of Evidence and specifically rule 402. Thus, efficiency, in the
sense that relevant evidence is not excluded, and uniformity, both
reasons for the creation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, are furthered by reading rule 402 as requiring the admission of copper
platter evidence. Finally, when considering the similarity in privilege rules and the exclusionary rule, Congress' strong stand on rule
501, that federal privilege law is to govern in federal criminal trials,
137. FED. R. EvD. 402.
138. Before adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure provided that the admissibility of evidence was to be determined by
principles of common law as interpreted by federal courts. FED. R. CraM. P. 26, 18 U.S.C.
app. R. 26 (1970). See note 114 supra.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure impose requirements for the issuance of a federal
search warrant in addition to constitutional requirements. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a)
(warrant may only be issued by a judge of the United States or of a state court of record).
However, if the search is a state search, with minimal or no federal involvement, the warrant
need only conform to federal constitutional requirements. See United States v. Millar, 543
F.2d 1280, 1283 (10th Cir. 1976). Thus, under the copper platter doctrine, a defendant who
is subjected to a search and seizure by state police loses the additional protections state law
would provide and the additional federal statutory protections. One court has shown some
sensitivity to this problem and stated:
[Piroducts of a search conducted under authority of a validly issued state warrant
are lawfully obtained for federal prosecutorial purposes if the warrant satisfies constitutional requirements and does not contravene any Rule-embodied policy designed to
protect the integrity of the federal courts or to govern the conduct of federal officers.
United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 43 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974)
(emphasis added). It is doubtful that by requiring the warrant to be validly issued under state
law the court meant to draw in state substantive law. Nevertheless, under this approach, the
defendant would appear to have the benefits of at least some of the additional federal statutory protections.
139. FED. R. Cram. P. 26, 18 U.S.C. app. R. 26 (1970), Notes of Advisory Committee on
Rules.
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strongly suggests the aforementioned reading of rule 402 is the correct one.
But the Supreme Court should not feel so limited in this area.
Congress did leave the Court with power to fashion other rules, 4 '
and authority for the change can be found in the Advisory Committee's Note to rule 402. "The rule recognizes but makes no attempt
to spell out the constitutional considerations which impose basic
limitations upon the admissibility of relevant evidence."'' By definition, copper platter evidence is not obtained in violation of the
United States Constitution. As noted earlier,' however, many have
misconstrued the situation and thought it to be a problem of constitutional magnitude. Congress could well have believed the problem
to be one with constitutional dimensions, thus recognizing the
power of the courts to restrict such evidence. Even assuming, however, Congress saw no constitutional infringement, it appears that
Congress simply did not address the issue, and did not intend rule
402 to mandate admission of evidence seized in violation of state law
by state police.
Despite the similarities between privileges and the exclusionary
rule, it cannot be asserted that Congress' action on one should influence the Court's treatment of the other. The interests at stake are
very much different. Privileges are intended to promote the full and
free disclosure of information in certain confidential relationships.
This is an important goal to be sure, but one not on the same plane
as controlling law enforcement officials. Much information is disclosed without reliance on, or even thought of, applicable privileges;'4 application of a narrower federal privilege, therefore, will
often have little effect on individual conduct. Failure to curb police
abuses, on the other hand, is likely to have broad social consequences, ultimately affecting many individual liberties. The state's
140. "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided. . . by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority." FED. R. EvD. 402. The
Supreme Court's statutory authority is found in 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970): "The Supreme
Court. . .shall have the power to prescribe. . . rules of. . .procedure. . . in criminal cases
. . . in the United States district courts .... " All rules, however, must be reported to
Congress which can act on the proposals or simply let the proposals become effective.
141. FED. R. Ev. 402, Notes of Advisory Committee on ProposedRules.
142. See notes 61-65 and accompanying text supra.
143. Wright notes: "Of course there is very little evidence that people consult the local
law of privilege before making, or refraining from making, confidential communication. Indeed such evidence as exists indicates that they do not." ProceduralReform, supra note 121,
at 573.
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interest is much more direct when the application of its exclusionary
rule isinvolved, since the state is primarily responsible for governing the conduct of its police.
A second and even more crucial distinction between privileges
and the exclusionary rule exists: the concept of judicial integrity as
a basis for the exclusionary rule. McCormick suggests that with the
deterrence aspect of the exclusionary rule becoming more questionable, it is the "moral position" which justifies continuation of the
rule. By refusing to accept and consider evidence tainted "by improper activity, the courts publicly reaffirm their own respect of
the underlying rules.""' A federal court can admit testimony which
would have been privileged under the state's rules without encouraging in any way an offense under state law. But in accepting evidence seized by state police in violation of state constitutional law,
the federal court is condoning the illegal police activity. Thus, simply because Congress emphatically stated that federal privilege law
is to apply in federal criminal trials, it does not follow that federal
courts should ignore a state's exclusionary rules in a federal criminal
trial where copper platter evidence has been offerred.
VIII. NEW APPROACH TO COPPER PLATTER PROBLEMS

A.

The States' Conflicts of Law Analysis

The Supreme Court must therefore reorient federal practice in its
handling of evidence seized by state police in violation of state law
and offered in a federal criminal trial. The states have been confronted by the same problem and their approaches are worthy of
note. The question before the state courts is first one of constitutional choice of law. It is generally believed that the fourth amend144. MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 166, at 368 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972). Chief Justice Burger, however, does not believe there is any validity to the "judicial
integrity" justification. "[Slettled rules demonstrate that the 'judicial integrity' rationalization is fatally flawed." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 499 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Burger's main argument is that the Court has refused to entertain claims that evidence was
unlawfully seized unless the claimant has standing. Notions of judicial integrity would call
for excluding the evidence regardless of the claimant's standing. A majority of the Court does
agree to some extent with Burger. In two recent cases in which the Court refused to extend
the exclusionary rule, the Court mentioned the "limited role" of the "judicial integrity"
justification in the determination of whether to apply the rule in a particular context. See
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 & n.35
(1976). Nevertheless, it is still a consideration and one which clearly distinguishes the exclusionary rules from privileges.
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ment requirements as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court are the only minimum standards an out-of-state search must
meet to be constitutionally admissible in a different state's criminal
proceeding. 45 Some courts have thus proceeded in a fashion similar
to the federal courts and simply apply their own law. In Burge v.
State,4 evidence seized in a search of the defendant's Oklahoma
apartment was admitted in his Texas criminal trial for burglary.
The search conducted by Oklahoma police was illegal under Oklahoma law, but valid under Texas law and the United States Constitution. Relying on traditional conflicts of law principles, the Texas
court classified evidentiary rules as rules of procedure and therefore
the law of the forum applied on all evidentiary issues.'47
The procedural/substantive law distinction and the doctrine of
lex loci, however, have fallen into disrepute as viable conflicts of law
principles.1' In their place is the significant relationship test: the
law to be applied to a particular issue is the law of the state that
has the most significant relationship to that issue. This more modern approach has found expression in some state copper platter
cases. In People v. Saiken, "I evidence seized in Indiana, invalid
under Indiana law, was admitted in an Illinois criminal trial. The
court found Illinois to be the state with the most significant relationship: the crime was committed in Illinois, the crime was prosecuted
in Illinois, the defendant was a resident and citizen of Illinois, and
a majority of the witnesses were Illinois residents. The court 'oncluded that Indiana had no vital contact with the crime, and therefore application of Illinois evidentiary rules would not offend interstate comity. 5 As a matter of pure conflicts law, the decision is
wrong. The court focused on Indiana's relationship to the crime in
which Indiana admittedly had no interest, and failed to concentrate
on Indiana's interest in the more narrow and appropriate issue, the
validity of the search. The search was conducted by Indiana police
145. Patterson v. Lash, 452 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1075 (1972)
(federal habeas relief denied to defendant convicted in Indiana state trial with evidence seized
by Ohio police in violation of Ohio law but valid under the United States Constitution).
146. 443 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 934 (1969).
147. Id. at 723. Demonstrating its insensitivity to the problem, the court justified applying
its own evidentiary rules by stating: "Any other view would lead to endless perplexity." Id.
148. See, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLCT OF LAws 200-10 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as WEINTRAUB].
149. 49 I11. 2d 504, 275 N.E.2d 381 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972).
150. Id. at 511, 275 N.E.2d at 385.
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in Indiana; Indiana's interest was thus clear. It follows that Illinois'
out-of-hand dismissal of comity objections was also wrong.
Apparently sensing this problem, the Illinois Court of Appeals
refined the argument in People v. DeMorrow.15, First it highlighted
stronger Illinois interests in both the crime and the search. Not only
was the crime committed in Illinois, but the victim was an Illinois
resident. Furthermore, the search in Michigan was conducted primarily by Illinois police officers. In the court's view, comity did not
require Illinois to encourage Illinois policemen to follow the procedures of other states, nor did it require Illinois to assist in supervising, through the use of the exclusionary rule, the Michigan police
officers. 52
What comity does require when the concern is the conduct of
another states' law enforcement officials is not as clear as the
DeMorrow court suggests, but the DeMorrow rationale is superior
to the Saiken decision since it considers the interests of the respecat hand-i. e., the manner in which
tive states in the specific issue
51 3
the evidence was obtained.

A lucid treatment of the respective interests of the states involved
in a copper platter question can be found in People v. Orlosky, "4
where a California court of appeals analyzed, with a proper regard
for interstate comity, the purposes to be served by an Indiana exclusionary rule.Is The defendant was convicted of theft from a company in California committed while he was an employee at the
company. One year after the defendant had terminated his employ151. 17 Ill. App. 3d 901, 308 N.E.2d 659, aff'd, 59 11. 2d 352, 320 N.E.2d 1 (1974).
152. Id. at 911, 308 N.E.2d at 665.
153. See also People v. Graham, 90 Misc. 2d 1019, 396 N.Y.S. 2d 966 (1977). A New York
citizen was robbed, kidnapped, and murdered in New York. The defendants, residents of New
York, were contesting searches made in New Jersey and Florida. The court admitted that
New Jersey and Florida had an interest in the case because of their interest in police conduct
within their respective territories. The court, however, believed those interests to be minor
compared to New York's interest in the prosecution of a crime committed against its resident
on its own soil. This was especially so because the police activity in New Jersey and Florida
was mainly conducted by New York police.
154. 40 Cal. App. 3d 935, 115 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1974).
155. The California court's discussion is to be distinguished from the federal court's
analysis of the exclusionary rule in copper platter doctrine cases criticized at notes 78-86 and
accompanying text supra. The federal courts have only considered the benefits and costs of
the exclusionary rule within the context of the federal court system and federal law enforcement; they have refused to consider what impact their rejection of the valid state rule will
have on the state. California addressed the question of what effect its rejecting or enforcing
another state's exclusionary rule would have on that state.
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ment, the contested evidence was seized by Indiana police while
searching the defendant's Indiana apartment on an unrelated
charge. The search was invalid under Indiana law. The California
court first rejected any notion that, in the interstate setting, the
exclusionary rule preserved judicial integrity by preventing the
courts from benefitting from the illegal acts of police officers. Copper platter evidence, reasoned the Orlosky court, can not impugn
the integrity of the court which admits it since the admitting court
does not regard the conduct which resulted in obtaining the evidence as improper. And surely, admission of the evidence in California did not affect the judicial integrity of the Indiana courts. The
court similarly disposed of the deterrence/discipline aspect of the
exclusionary rule. The court admitted Indiana had an interest in
disciplining its officers wherever the criminal action was brought.
But the court reasoned that excluding from a California criminal
trial evidence illegally seized by Indiana police would have little
deterrent effect."" This was particularly apparent under the facts of
Orlosky. The search by Indiana police was in relation to an Indiana
crime. Whatever Indiana intended to accomplish by imposing the
exclusionary rule in Indiana trials was in no way advanced by extending the rule to California trials, since the police were operating
solely with a view toward Indiana law. The Orlosky court logically
concluded that Indiana's interest in applying the rule to the California trial was minimal and more than outweighed by California's
interest in an unimpeded local prosecution of a local crime.
The outcome in the state courts, even though the significant relationship test is being applied, has thus far paralleled the federal
court results-the laws of the prosecuting forum are applied. But
the state courts are focusing on the much more relevant question:
what are the interests of the state where the alleged police misconduct occurred vis a vis the interest of the prosecuting state.
B. The New Approach for Federal Courts
The federal courts should adopt a similar balancing of interests
test. Undoubtedly, weighing the interests of one independent sovereign against those of another is a difficult task for any court to
undertake.' 7 In fact, one might well question: why should such con156.
157.

40 Cal. App. 3d at 939, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
See Wam'TRAua, supra note 148, at 234. Recall, this was the Texas court's justification
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fusion be added to a criminal trial if the decision on admissibility
will not be altered? Commentators in conflicts of laws studies have
analyzed the relatively recent shift to the significant interest approach and noted that a court's announcement that its interests are
found to be weightier is not likely to be particularly cogent.,"s Thus,
the preceeding state decisions may be open to attack. But whether
those cases demonstrate a proper balancing of state versus state
interest is not of utmost importance here. Because state and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction, an analysis of their respective
interests will be much different and, it is suggested, the interests are
weighted in favor of applying state law, at least in some situations.
Often, the place of the crime, the place of the police misconduct,
and the residence of the victim and the defendant will be within the
jurisdiction of both the state and federal court. These factors indicate a strong state interest notwithstanding that prosecution is for
a federal crime. In the state versus state setting, where the crime
was committed never coincided with where the police misconduct
occurred. When the issue is federal versus state, the state is interested in the prosecution of the federal crime because, usually, the
defendant's alleged acts will also constitute a state crime. The state
in a sense, has chosen not to prosecute, or at least not to convict the
defendant with the evidence that state police illegally obtained.
Some weight should be accorded this decision.
*Next, the state has a strong interest in controlling its police, and
a stricter exclusionary rule is one means it has employed to accomplish this. In contrast to the little effect at the state versus state
level, ignoring a state's exclusionary rule in federal court will have
an impact. The state police official can conduct himself with an eye
toward both the state and the less restrictive federal law.'59 If his
for refusing to consider another state's evidentiary rules in Burge v. State, 443 S.W.2d 720
(Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 934 (1969). See note 146-47 and accompanying text
supra. In dissenting in Elkins, Justice Frankfurter admitted there would be difficulties in
applying state law to state searches. But he believed the difficulties were "inherent in evolving harmonious relations in the interconnected interests between the States and the Nation
in our federal system." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 251 (1960). Whatever consequences resulted, including occasional frustration of important federal prosecutions, were, to
Justice Frankfurter, more than outweighed by the support which should be afforded to valid
state law enforcement.

158.

See

WEINTRAUB,

supra note 148, at 234.

159. See notes 101-03 and accompanying text supra. Since many criminal acts are both
state and federal crimes, the local police need not be concerned with stricter state standards;
even if the evidence is suppressed in the state trial, it will be admitted in a federal trial.
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misconduct is alleged and proved in state criminal proceedings, he
may still secure a conviction by turning the evidence over to the
federal authorities, knowing his conduct would be considered permissible by federal standards.
The judicial integrity concept also has vitality in the federal versus state arena. Unlike a state court which will only occasionally
rule on the conduct of the police of a different sovereign, a federal
court will frequently receive evidence obtained by police of the state
in which the court sits. The federal court surely risks being viewed
as a depository for "sordid" state police activities.
Of course, other factors should go into the balance, specifically:
was the search state or federal in nature and was the search in
connection with a purely federal crime or was a state criminal statute also arguably violated. As the police conduct becomes more
federal in nature, thestate's interestlin controlling that conduct
diminishes.16 0
IX.

CONCLUSION

Tension between federal and state courts is inherent in our federal
system."6 ' But "[tihe happy relation of states to nation . . . is in
no small measure dependent on the wisdom with which the scope
and limits of the federal courts are determined."' 62 The Supreme
160. A whole body of case law has developed to determine when a search is federal or state
in nature. See note 15 supra. This would appear to be a useful approach to the balancing
issue. As noted, see note 49 supra, the state has less interest and certainly little power to effect
a search federal in nature. But when the search is state in nature, the state interest is
apparent and should be respected.
Judge Ziegler, originally a Pennsylvania common pleas judge and now a federal district
judge, has also advocated the abolishment of the copper platter doctrine. But he does so under
much more restricted circumstances: "Federal courts should abandon the test which provides
that a federal court will consider only federal constitutional imperatives when a state court
adjudicates a matter under state law." Ziegler, supra note 11, at 253. The state's interest
would certainly be apparent under these facts. If the state has begun criminal proceedings,
then the defendant has allegedly committed a state crime. Furthermore comity considerations would appear to be stronger when the state has already adjudicated the evidentiary
matter. However, the cases adjudicated by state courts do not represent all matters in which
the state has an interest. Often the decision will be made at the District Attorney's office not
to prosecute, realizing that the evidence could not be introduced in state court. Second, and
more importantly, the state interest we are concerned with is control of state police conduct.
Where the search is basically a federal search and only incidentally is evidence turned over
to state authorities, then the state has little interest in a subsequent federal criminal trial.
161. See Frankfurter, Distributionof Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 500 (1928).
162. Id.
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Notes

Court has recently indicated a willingness to sacrifice federal interests to prevent clashes with state courts.. In Juidice v. Vail,'13 the
plaintiff sought to enjoin a state civil contempt proceeding allegedly
depriving him of due process, by instituting a section 1983 action.
Despite the fact that section 1983 was intended to interpose federal
courts between the states and individuals, the Court extended the
abstention doctrine to section 1983 claims based on notions of comity. Section 1983, if it is to be effective, would appear to be antithetical to comity. The federal intrusion is arguably greater when it
directly affects on-going state proceedings, certainly a concern in
Juidice, but the Court has demonstrated similar respect for state
interests in federal habeas corpus proceedings, wherein defendants
collaterally attack their finalized state convictions. In Wainwright
v. Sykes,' 4 the Court held that the defendant's failure to make a
timely objection under a state contemporaneous objection rule to
statements allegedly taken in violation of the Miranda rules barred
federal habeas review in the absence of a showing of cause for the
noncompliance and a showing of actual prejudice. The Court rejected an earlier case which gave the federal courts much more
latitude in such situations' 5 because the previous decision accorded
too little respect to a state procedural rule, a. rule employed by a
coordinate jurisdiction within the federal system.
In both cases, the parties were asserting important federal rights;
thus, the federal interest was clear and strong. But, the Court never
suggested it was without power to act; rather, it imposed limitations
on federal courts because of considerations of comity.'" It is apparent, then, that the existence of federal interests, even strong federal
interests, should not preclude an examination of the state interests.
It is primarily the states which are responsible for combatting
crime within their jurisdictions while at the same time effectively
controlling the conduct of the police and thereby protecting the
freedom of their citizens. The states, in fact, have often been viewed
as laboratories, experimenting with various approaches to improve
criminal justice while meeting the minimum federal constitutional
163. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
164. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
165. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (state prisoner is denied access to federal habeas
relief only upon a finding that he "deliberately bypassed" a state rule, and thus waived his
right to present the federal issue to the state courts).
166. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 83, 88; Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. at 335 n.11.
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requirements." 7 Those states which have imposed constitutional
restrictions on police greater than those required by the United
States Constitution have chosen to provide greater breathing space
for the individual liberties involved. Reiterating the observations of
Professor Krattenmaker, respecting the state exclusionary rule
avoids a monolithic single shot judgment on what is the proper
balance between liberties and the need for evidence.'68 Rejecting the
state rules at the federal trial will surely frustrate, to some degree,
the states' experimentation. More importantly, federalism would
seem to require that federal courts respect state laws tailored to
meet local problems.'69 Controls on local police should therefore be
enforced even at the federal level.
To date, very few federal courts have even considered the valid
state interests present when evidence seized by state police in violation of state law is offered in a federal criminal trial. The federal
courts should adopt a conflicts of law significant relationship or
balancing of interests test to resolve these issues. Furthermore, if
the courts give adequate consideration to the opposing interests,
they will often, if not always, apply the state law to determine the
validity of a "state search."
GEORGE C. WERNER
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168.
169.

See note 127 supra.
Krattenmaker, supra note 123, at 101.
Id. at 102.

